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Germany and EU Energy Policy: Conflicted Champion of Integration? 
 
John S. Duffield and Kirsten Westphal 
 
   
 
Germany is critical to the development of a common EU energy policy.  It is by far the 
largest energy user of the 27 member states, accounting for approximately 18 percent of total 
energy consumption in the EU (BP 2010).  It is also a substantial energy producer, ranking 
second in the production of coal (after Poland) and second in nuclear electricity generation (after 
France).  Finally, Germany plays a crucial role by virtue of its central geographical location, 
which puts it in middle of regional natural gas and electric power distribution networks. 
Germany has traditionally been one of the most consistent proponents of European 
integration.   It was one of the six members of the three original European communities and, 
along with France, has often been regarded as the “motor” of European integration.  In more 
recent years, Germany championed monetary union and the enlargement of European Union to 
include many of the Central European countries of the former Soviet bloc. 
When it comes to recent developments in EU energy policy, however, Germany has 
exhibited much more ambivalence.  It has backed some EU energy policy initiatives, especially 
those concerning climate change, renewable sources of energy, and energy conservation.  But it 
has resisted a number of others, such as the liberalization of the gas and electricity markets and 
the creation of a common external energy policy.  And even in cases where Germany has been 
generally supportive of a common energy policy objective, is has often fought hard to put its 
own stamp on the details, such as the mechanisms for promoting renewable energy sources and 
the implementation of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). 
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This chapter explores the mixed pattern of German support for a common EU energy 
policy over the past decade.  It begins by describing Germany’s energy situation at the beginning 
of the 2000s and the energy challenges Germany has faced in recent years.  It then describes the 
key features of German energy policy over the same period and how these have played 
themselves out at the EU level.  A fourth section explores the determinants of German energy 
policy and its ambivalent attitude toward a common EU energy policy.  The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the implication of German policy for the future of EU energy policy. 
A. Background 
1. Germany’s Energy Mix in 2000 
As Germany entered the 2000s, its mix of energy sources had changed substantially since 
before the first oil shock in 1973.  Oil continued to command the biggest share of Germany’s 
primary energy consumption (PEC), at just under 40 percent.  But this figure was down 
substantially from the peak of 57 percent in the former West Germany, reached in the early 
1970s (BP 2010).  Virtually all of the oil consumed in Germany was imported, with nearly one-
third coming from Russia (IEA 2002, 58).  But this import dependence raised few concerns, 
since petroleum and petroleum products from one foreign supplier can be substituted relatively 
easily by those from another. 
Next came coal, which accounted for just over a quarter of Germany’s PEC, a figure that 
had been fairly steady since the mid-1990s.  Coal, especially brown coal (lignite), generated 
more than half of Germany’s electricity, while hard coal was used in steel production.  Although 
domestic coal production had declined as inefficient mines were closed, especially in the former 
eastern states, it still provided for about two-thirds of German coal consumption. 
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Third on the list was natural gas, which had met about 22 percent of Germany’s energy 
needs since the mid-1990s.  Germany was not entirely dependent on gas imports, producing 
about 20 percent of its consumption at home.   But most imported gas arrived via fixed pipelines 
from just three countries -- Russia (45 percent in 2002), Norway (27 percent), and the 
Netherlands (22 percent) – and could not easily be replaced in the event of a supply disruption 
(AGEB 2010; IEA 2002, 76). 
Nuclear power plants accounted for 30 percent of electricity production in 2000.  At the 
time, Germany had 19 operating commercial nuclear reactors, but none had come on line since 
1988, and the former East German reactors had all been shut down for safety reasons (IEA 2002, 
111). 
Bringing up the rear were renewable sources of energy.  These accounted for just 3.4 
percent of PEC and 7.3 percent of electric power generation in 2000.  But the contribution from 
renewable sources was growing rapidly, having doubled since 1990.  In 2000, Germany was the 
world leader in wind power production and had the highest installed solar electric capacity in 
Europe (IEA 2002, 91-92). 
2. General Goals and Challenges of German Energy Policy in the 2000s 
 German energy policy has been guided by three primary goals: 
1) economic efficiency, especially in the form of affordable energy prices (Wirtschaftlichkeit); 
2) environmental protection and sustainability (Umweltverträglichkeit); and 
3) security of supply (Versorgungssicherheit). 
Economic efficiency has been perhaps the most constant goal of postwar German energy 
policy.  During the second half of the 1980s and most of the 1990s, its achievement did not seem 
particularly problematic.  Energy, and especially oil, prices were generally low.  In the late 1990s 
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and 2000s, however, it became a matter of increasing concern as oil prices rose more or less 
steadily.  
In comparison, environmental sustainability is a relatively new goal.  It first appeared in 
the 1970s in the form of worries about the safety of nuclear power plants and the disposal of 
nuclear waste.  Since the late 1980s and 1990s, however, increasing attention has been devoted 
to the closely related challenges of climate change and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, much of which are attributable to energy consumption.  Public concern about climate 
change reached a crescendo in 2007, with the publication by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change of its Fourth Assessment Report, but the issue has often dominated the German 
energy policy agenda in recent years.   
In response, the government has adopted a series of ambitious goals and programs.  In 
1995, it established a goal of cutting CO2 emissions by 25 percent over the period 1990-2005.  
And at the end of the 1990s, it agreed to reduce its GHG emissions by 21 percent (compared to 
1990 levels) within the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement under the Kyoto Protocol (IEA 2002, 
38).  In 2000, the government adopted a comprehensive National Climate Protection Programme.  
And the Integrated Energy and Climate Programme (IECP) approved by the government in 2007 
was largely, if not entirely, aimed at the addressing the problem of climate change (Duffield 
2009).  As Chancellor Angela Merkel stated, “with this program, we are taking on the central 
challenge of the 21st century, climate change” (Bundesregierung 2007).  The government offered 
to reduce Germany’s CO2 emissions by a breathtaking  40 percent below the 1990 level by 2020, 
conditional, however, on the EU achieving a 30 percent reduction over the same time period and 
other states committing themselves to similarly ambitious goals. 
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After spiking in the 1970s and early 1980 as a result of the oil shocks, concerns about 
energy security remained largely dormant during the next two decades.  Even Germany’s 
increasing reliance on energy imports, which reached 60 percent of total consumption in 2000 
(IEA 2002, 28), raised few alarms.   German officials emphasized that the country’s energy 
supplies were highly reliable.  Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, could be counted on for 
promised deliveries of oil and gas, and Germany possessed large petroleum stockpiles and gas 
storage facilities that it could draw upon in the event of an emergency. 
Thus energy security did not regain prominence as a policy issue until the beginning of 
2006.  The occasion was the gas dispute that erupted that January between Russia and Ukraine.  
Over the next several years, additional events raised further questions about Russia’s 
dependability as an energy supplier. 
B. Key Elements of German Energy Policy in the 2000s 
How has Germany sought to promote its energy policy goals and address the 
corresponding challenges in the past decade? 
One major thrust of Germany policy, which dates back to the 1970s, has been to reduce 
energy consumption by increasing energy efficiency.  Germany had long maintained substantial 
excise taxes on most fossil fuels, and in 1999, the government introduced a new “eco tax” on 
motor fuels, heating fuels,  and electricity, which was gradually raised over the next four years 
and was intended in large part to encourage energy savings.  Early in the 2000s, the government 
quickly implemented EU directives on energy labeling of appliances and the energy performance 
of buildings, and it established a program to provide financial support for building renovations 
that improved energy efficiency and reduced CO2 emissions.  The 2005 grand coalition 
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agreement established the ambitious objective of doubling energy productivity by the year 2020 
compared with 1990, which would require annual increases of around 3 percent. 
A somewhat newer but equally important component of German policy has been the 
promotion of renewable energy sources, especially for electricity production.  The use of 
renewables could serve to reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel imports.  The 
first major step was the 1991 Electricity Feed Law, which obliged power companies to buy all 
the electricity generated from wind, hydropower, biomass, and solar energy in their distribution 
areas at a price, or feed-in tariff,  based on the end-use cost to consumers.  The 2000 Renewable 
Energy Act extended coverage to additional renewable sources, such as landfill gas and 
geothermal energy, and revised the feed-in tariff formula to reflect the cost of each technology 
and to provide long-term certainty for both developers and users (IEA 2002, 93-94). 
As a result of these incentives, German renewable energy output grew at an annual rate of 
12 percent between 2000 and 2006 (IEA 2007, 65).  Thus Germany was able to meet its initial 
goals of generating 12.5 percent of its electricity and 4.2 percent of total energy consumption 
from renewable sources by 2010 well ahead of schedule.  That rapid progress prompted the 
“Black-Red” grand coalition (2005-2009) to establish even more ambitious targets for renewable 
energy sources for 2020: at least 20 percent of electricity generation and at least 10 percent of the 
total energy supply.  The coalition also introduced a biofuels obligation that would rise to 6.75 
percent of the fuel supply in 2010, exceeding the corresponding EU target of 5.75 percent, and 
then to 8 percent in 2015 (IEA 2007, 72). 
While consistently promoting energy efficiency and renewables, recent Germany energy 
policy has been less consistent in other areas.  One has been the issue of energy market structure.  
The German government has frequently expressed support for competitive energy markets, 
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largely as a way of holding down energy prices.  But it has also supported the establishment and 
maintenance of large national energy companies that could use domestic market power to 
increase their leverage in negotiations with foreign energy companies, such as Gazprom (Buchan 
2009, 16).  Thus when the Federal Cartel Office rejected the merger of one of the four dominant 
electric utilities, E.On, with the leading natural gas supplier, Ruhrgas, It was overruled by the 
Federal Minister of Economics (BWMi)
  
1
 (Müller 2007, 32-33; Westphal 2007, 100).  For 
domestic political and social reasons, the government also maintained subsidies for hard coal 
production, although in 2007 an agreement was reached to phase them out over the following 
decade. 
Inconsistency has also characterized Germany policy toward nuclear power, despite the 
widespread revival of interest in nuclear power – the so-called “nuclear renaissance” -- that 
concerns about climate change and energy security have occasioned in a number of other 
countries.  The Green party grew out of the nuclear protest movement in the 1970s, and the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) had opposed nuclear power since the mid-1980s.  When these 
two parties formed a “Red-Green” coalition government (1998-2005), one of their top priorities 
was to wean the country off of nuclear power.    In 2000, the Red-Green government reached an 
agreement with the electrical utilities, formalized in a 2002 law, to phase out all nuclear power 
plants by limiting their effective lifetimes.  No new plants could be constructed, and the last 
operating facility would go out of service around 2022 (Westphal 2009a). 
Many outside the government, including the opposition parties, questioned the wisdom of 
the nuclear phase-out, which would deprive Germany of a carbon-free energy source and 
potentially increase Germany’s dependence on energy imports.  And when the center-right 
CDU/CSU formed a grand coalition with the SPD in 2005, some of its leaders called for at least 
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extending the lifetimes of the existing nuclear power plants.  Still, the SPD held firm, insisting 
that there be no change in the policy as a condition for joining the new government.  The 2009 
election of a CDU/CSU-Liberal “Black-Yellow” coalition, however, created a new opportunity 
to revisit the phase out, and in September 2010, the government called for a temporary extension 
(12 years on average) of the lifetimes of the remaining 17 power plants (BMWi/BMU 2010). 
A final important aspect of German energy policy that has seen changing emphasis has 
been the external dimension.  The Red-Green coalition, headed by Gerhard Schröder, 
emphasized building and maintaining bilateral ties with Russia (see the contribution by Grätz in 
this volume).  It promoted in particular the construction by a consortium of Russian and German 
energy companies of a natural gas pipeline under the North Sea that would link Germany directly 
to Russian gas supplies.  In the view of one experienced observer, “Germany has asserted that it 
reserves the right to work out its long-term energy security with Russia on a bilateral, mutually 
beneficial, pragmatic footing - and that it brooks no outside or third-party intervention” 
(Bhadrakumar 2006). 
Although led by a former Schröder protégé, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the foreign 
ministry in the subsequent Black-Red grand coalition placed more emphasis on multilaterism.  
The overall goal was to promote greater dialogue among producer, consumer, and transit 
countries in order to emphasize their common interest in stable and predictable energy trade.  
Steinmeier repeatedly called for the creation of a system of cooperation energy security, which, 
he argued, would help to build mutual understanding and trust.  And with regard to Russia in 
particular, the new government’s principal approach was to try to embed Russia in a multilateral 
rule-based framework for trade and investment based on liberal principles of market access.  The 
foreign ministry hoped to induce Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and its important 
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transit protocol and, that failing, to replace the expiring EU-Russia partnership and cooperation 
agreement (PCA) with a new one that contained a substantial section on energy (Duffield 
2009).
 
2
 
C. Germany and EU Energy Policy in 2000s: Implications of German Energy Policy 
Recent Germany energy policy has had mixed implications for the establishment of a 
common EU energy policy.  Overall, one could say that Germany has been at best ambivalent 
about developments at the EU level.  In some respects, Germany has made EU energy policy a 
top priority, especially where doing so has been seen as a means of achieving Germany’s goals 
of fighting climate change and, to a lesser extent, energy security.  Indeed, energy policy was a 
special focus during the German presidency of the EU during the first half of 2007, which saw 
the adoption of a set of ambitious EU energy policy goals at the spring meeting of the Council 
(Silberberg 2006).  Among the goals that Germany set for the Presidency were 
O Boosting energy efficiency, 
O Promoting greater use of renewable energies, 
O Completing the internal markets for gas and electricity, and 
O Making the EU more visible as a player at the international level and putting its 
partnerships with key producer, transit, and consumer countries on a solid and reliable 
footing (Silberberg 2006). 
 
In other respects, however, Germany has resisted movement in the direction of a common 
EU energy policy.  In this regard, there was little change from the previous decade, when the 
government was described as one of those most reluctant to see a European energy policy 
develop, preferring to retain autonomy in the pursuit of supply security…  (Jochem et al. 1996, 
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82) In the 2000s, Germany opposed the inclusion of an energy chapter in the proposed European 
constitution, when that ill-fated project was still being considered (Müller 2005, 178).  Although 
an energy chapter was eventually included in the Lisbon Treaty, which stood in for the 
unsuccessful constitutional project, it nevertheless reflected Germany’s consistent insistence that 
each member state should be free to determine its own energy mix, a position that became only 
more rigid following the decision to phase-out nuclear power plants.  As one of the State 
Secretaries in the Foreign Ministry argued shortly before the beginning of the German EU 
presidency, 
Brussels must respect Member States’ particularities, including the issue of their national 
energy mix.  We are firmly convinced that enhanced energy cooperation at the European 
level, which we champion, cannot override Member States’ decisions on the makeup of 
their energy sources.  This especially applies to Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear 
power in accordance with the Coalition Agreement (Silberberg 2006). 
With regard to more specific aspects of EU energy policy, Germany has resisted many of 
the Commission’s initiatives for liberalizing the gas and electricity markets.  And the external 
aspects of German energy policy have often had the effect, whether intentionally or not, of 
making it difficult for the EU to speak with one voice on energy issues. 
1. Areas of Support 
Germany has been most supportive of EU initiatives in the areas of energy efficiency, 
renewable energy sources, and climate policy.  Germany strongly endorsed the Commission’s 
2007 proposal to increase renewables and efficiency and to reduce GHG emissions all by 20 
percent by 2020, and it has sometimes proposed even more ambitious goals.  Likewise, the grand 
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coalition’s own 2007 Integrated Energy and Climate Program was viewed in large part as its 
effort to implement the EU’s 20-20-20 in 20 goals at the national level. 
Nevertheless, important differences have existed between Germany and the Commission 
over the details of these policies.  For example, Germany’s support for ambitious renewable 
energy targets has been conditioned on being able to maintain the use of feed-in tariffs, which 
have been viewed as so successful at promoting the development of renewable sources in 
Germany.  Thus, on at least two occasions -- at the beginning of the 2000s prior to the adoption 
of the 2001 EU directive on the production of electricity from renewable sources and again prior 
to the 2008 directive on the promotion of renewable energy sources -- Germany has resisted 
Commission proposals to establish obligatory quota systems, which would mandate that certain 
quantitative levels be achieved by certain dates (Mahony 2007; see also Eikeland’s contribution 
to this volume). 
As Jørgen Wettestad points out in his contribution to this volume, Germany has also had 
an uneasy relationship with the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).  In Wettestad’s estimation, 
Germany’s initial National Allocation Plan (NAP) for the first phase of the ETS (2005-2007) 
was only average and may even have involved an over allocation of emissions permits.  Then in 
2006, the German government proposed a reduction in its overall allocation for the second phase 
(482 million tonnes of carbon dioxide) that was just 3.4 percent lower than in the first.  The 
Commission found this inadequate and unilaterally cut the proposed allocation by another seven 
percent, to 453 million tonnes, a level that the government was eventually forced to accept 
(Müller 2007, 31).  More recently, Germany has criticized Commission proposals to reduce 
substantially the total allowed number of permits, to begin auctioning permits (rather than 
continuing to give them away to industry and utilities), and to centralize the auctioning of 
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emissions permits (rather than allowing each member state to conduct its own auctions) (Phillips 
2008; Wettestad in this volume).  Germany has also sought to give generous emissions 
allowances to coal-fired power plants (IEA 2007, 12 and 29). 
2. Areas of Resistance 
Germany has exhibited even more ambivalence toward the EU’s project to create a single 
internal energy market.  The German government has frequently expressed its support for this 
goal.  For example, during its 2007 EU Presidency, the completion of the internal energy market 
was sometimes described as the government’s “highest priority.”  In practice, however, Germany 
has put up considerable resistance to the proposals emanating from Brussels almost every step of 
the way (see also Buchan 2009, 21). 
This resistance began in the 1990s, when the first EU directives on the electricity and gas 
markets were negotiated.  Even then, 
in contrast to its professed free market approach to the energy sector, the German 
government has been rather ambivalent about the liberalization of energy utility markets 
both at home and in a European context.  It has offered only half-hearted support to the 
Commission in its attempts to open up electricity markets while it was strongly opposed 
to similar moves in the gas sector (Jochem et al. 1996, 82) 
For example, Germany opposed the Commission’s proposal that third party access (TPA) to the 
electricity grids be regulated as a way of reducing hidden barriers to entry and instead insisted on 
including the option of negotiated TPA, which Germany alone exercised.  As a result, the 
German market remained effectively closed to foreign suppliers (IEA 2002, 108; Buchan 2008, 
22). 
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In the early 2000s, as the Commission prepared a second package of internal energy 
market directives, Germany opposed, unsuccessfully this time, the organizational separation of 
energy companies’ transmission activities from their generation and supply activities, even 
though this arrangement, known as legal unbundling, is regarded as one of the weakest means for 
ensuring an open market (Eikeland in this volume; IEA 2007, 10).  And when the second 
package, adopted in 2003, mandated that each country establish national regulatory agencies for 
gas and electricity, Germany was the last member state to do so (Buchan 2009, 22).  According 
to an IEA analysis, “The installation of a network regulator in 2005 signals Germany’s 
acknowledgement that negotiated reform and internal regulation of the energy markets were 
unsuccessful” (IEA 2007, 9).  Yet even then, the new Federal Network Agency 
(Bundesnetzagentur, or BNA) could devote only limited resources to energy regulation, since it 
was also responsible for other network industries (Buchan 2009, 47). 
When further delays in the establishment of open energy markets prompted the 
Commission to develop a third energy package in the late 2000s, Germany once again sought to 
water down the provisions to the greatest extent possible.  This time, the Commission called for 
full ownership unbundling as a way of breaking the stranglehold of the powerful, vertically 
integrated gas and electricity companies in countries like Germany.  The German government, 
along with those of France and other countries whose gas and electricity markets are dominated 
by one or a small number of companies, however, expressed strong opposition to this proposal.  
As a result, the Commission was forced to resort to its fall back position of mandating the 
establishment of independent system operators (ISO) that “manage and operate transmission 
system assets without influence from transmission owners, but do not own the assets themselves” 
(IEA 2007, 38).  Yet even this compromise was not deemed sufficient by Germany and others.  
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They insisted instead that the third package include the option for an independent transmission 
operator  (ITO), which would not establish as many barriers between the network owners and 
operators (Buchan 2009, 72). 
Another aspect of the original Commission proposal that Germany successfully opposed 
was the so-called “reciprocity clause.”  As described in Eikeland and Grätz’s contributions to 
this volume, this provision would have prevented companies from non-member countries from 
controlling gas and electricity networks unless an agreement on mutual market access to the 
transmission assets in the potential investor’s home country had been concluded (see also Grätz 
2009, 77). Informally known as the “Gazprom clause,” it was seen as being primarily aimed at 
requiring Russia to open its energy market and transmission networks to third parties in return 
for allowing the Russian state-owned gas company to invest in EU markets. 
This last element of German policy toward the liberalization of the EU energy markets is 
linked to its approach to external energy relations in the late 1990s and 2000s.  During the Red-
Green coalition, Germany became the driving force for a renewed, special EU-Russia partnership 
(Westphal 2007, 105).  As a practical matter, however, the government’s external policy was 
characterized by a shift away from multilateralism to a more unilateral pursuit of national 
interests (Westphal 2007, 101, 111).  The government’s efforts to help German energy 
companies become internationally competitive and expand their activities abroad (as a way of 
enhancing Germany’s energy security) had negative implications for the EU’s attempts at 
promoting multilateral governance and common institutions in relations with Russia.  The 
Schröder government’s use of its strong personal ties with the Putin administration to promote 
German-Russian energy relations undermined the Commission’s efforts to establish a common 
foreign energy policy and, paradoxically, limited the opportunities of the EU as a whole to 
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diversify its energy supply and increase its energy security (Westphal 2007, 93, 112).  This 
approach was perhaps most evident in the Schröder government’s strong backing of the Nord 
Stream pipeline project, which would provide a direct link between Germany and Russian gas 
supplies. 
The prospects for German support for a common external EU energy policy seemed to 
improve during the subsequent grand coalition.  From the outset, Chancellor Merkel exhibited 
more skepticism toward Russia, an attitude that was only reinforced by the Russia-Ukraine gas 
conflict in early 2006.  Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Steinmeier offered much rhetorical support 
for the development of a European external policy that would enable the EU to speak with a 
single voice.  He placed considerable emphasis on getting Russia to ratify the EU’s Energy 
Charter Treaty or at least to negotiate an energy agreement grounded in the principles contained 
in the unratified treaty (Duffield 2009).  And as noted above, improving external energy relations 
was one of the goals of Germany’s EU Presidency in 2007.  But these ideas were not 
accompanied by concrete proposals to increase either the EU’s legal competence or its 
institutional capacity to conduct a common external energy policy.  To the contrary, Germany 
never relinquished its prerogatives to act unilaterally in this area. 
D. Determinants of German Energy Policy 
How are we to explain and understand Germany’s mixed record of support for a common 
EU energy policy in recent years?  A logical place to begin is with general societal preferences.   
Of particular relevance in this context is the high level of concern about the environment that has 
characterized German society, although this environmentalism has, paradoxically, cut both ways.  
On the one hand, acute concerns about climate change have done much to motivate significant 
efforts by governments of all political stripes to promote energy efficiency, renewable sources of 
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energy, and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions at both the national and European levels.  On 
the other hand, widespread concern about nuclear power, ranging from ambivalence to outright 
opposition, underlay the Red-Green coalition’s decision to phase-out nuclear power and the 
inability of any government to facilitate the construction of new power plants.  These policies, in 
turn, have created an obstacle to cooperation with EU partners on some energy issues and 
reinforced Germany’s determination to maintain national autonomy over the choice of energy 
sources. 
Arguably, however, an even more important determinant has been the structure of the 
energy economy, especially those aspects concerning electricity and gas.  Ironically, as the EU 
has sought to increase competition in the gas and electricity markets, those industries have been 
concentrated in fewer hands in Germany.   The number of major supraregional gas companies 
that owned the major pipeline systems and accounted for most of Germany’s gas imports 
declined from six to as few as four during the 2000s (IEA 2002, 73-74; IEA 2007, 99).  
Similarly, electricity generation and transmission have been dominated by just four supraregional 
companies -- E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall -- that control about three-quarters of the 
country’s generation capacity and have accounted for an even higher percentage of the electricity 
actually produced (IEA 2007, 127).  These companies have divided Germany into four regions in 
which they act as quasi-monopolies (Müller 2007, 29). 
Two characteristics of the major energy companies have underpinned German resistance 
to the creation a common EU energy policy.  First, as suggested above, they are vertically 
integrated.  Not only do the Big Four electricity companies produce and transmit most of the 
electricity, but they also dominate retail supply and distribution, in part through cross-ownership 
of municipal utilities and in part directly (IEA 2007, 30; Müller 2007, 29).  Such vertical 
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integration furthers the narrow commercial interests of the companies themselves.  But some 
have argued that it also serves the national interest, by enabling German companies to compete 
with other national champions in the EU and by increasing their leverage in negotiations with 
foreign suppliers (see also Eikeland’s contribution to this volume).   In any case, the German 
electricity and gas companies have strongly lobbied at the national and EU levels against such 
measures as legal and ownership unbundling in order to maintain their profitable vertically 
integrated corporate structures as well as their oligopolistic market structures. 
The other important characteristic with implications for Germany’s support for a 
common EU energy policy are the close ties that the gas companies have with Russia.  Ruhrgas, 
now E.On Ruhrgas, is currently the largest foreign shareholder in Gazprom, with about 6.4 
percent of the shares, and it has a strategic interest in maintaining close energy ties with 
Gazprom and in expanding into the exploration and production of Russian gas because it 
produces only five percent of the gas it sells.  Likewise, BASF Wintershall has a history of 
various cross-ownership deals with Gazprom.  Both companies hold long-term gas delivery 
contracts with Russia that extend beyond 2030. 
These structural linkages between German and Russian companies created an alliance of 
interests that undermined, or at least weakened, the Commission’s efforts to extend competition 
within and beyond the EU’s borders (Westphal 2007, 105).  The German gas importers prefer to 
minimize competition on the German market because of the vulnerability inherent in their long-
term purchasing contracts from Gazprom (Müller 2007, 39).  In addition, E.On Ruhrgas and 
Wintershall lobbied strongly for the Nord Stream project, in which they were junior partners to 
Gazprom, because it would strengthen their position on the international and EU markets 
(Westphal 2007, 111). 
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This discussion of the electricity and gas industries raises the issue of the relationship 
between business and government.  The interests of the energy companies would not matter so 
much if they did not receive expression in government policy.  In fact, however, many 
companies have enjoyed close links with, and presumably have exercised considerable influence 
over, at least parts of the government, and these ties may have grown even stronger during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s when the government was negotiating the first stages of the 
liberalization process and the nuclear phase out (Westphal 2007, 105). 
The energy industry has been one of the main constituencies of Federal Ministry of 
Economics (BMWi).   And as long-term energy policy analyst Friedemann Müller has argued, 
the close links between energy companies and BMWi have resulted in a conservative German 
policy toward the EU.  In particular, the resistance of energy companies to EU energy market 
liberalization efforts has influenced the BMWi position in Brussels negotiations.  In Müller’s 
view, the BMWi reflexively defends the interests of the energy industry under almost any 
circumstances (Müller 2005, 177-78; see also Müller 2007, 33). 
It is not just a matter of industry using its allies in government to do its bidding, however.  
The relationship is more complicated than that.  While the companies seek to influence the 
government in order to promote their self-interest, many government officials view strong 
energy companies as serving German national interests. 
A final factor shaping German policy has been differences in the orientations of the major 
political parties.  The SPD has traditionally been more open to cooperation with first the Soviet 
Union and then Russia, while the CDU/CSU has been more wary.  These differences were on 
display in the contrasting approaches of Schröder and Merkel, described above.  In addition, the 
CDU/CSU has been more supportive of European integration and market liberalization.  Thus 
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the CDU/CSU-FDP government under Helmut Kohl (1982-1998), which oversaw the 
implementation of the Single European Act and negotiated the Economic and Monetary Union, 
may have been more supportive of the initial steps toward the creation of a single energy market 
than was the following SPD-Green coalition. 
 Nevertheless, these differences should not be exaggerated.  For example, since the 1970s, 
both major parties have tended to hold a more positive view of the Soviet Union/Russia than 
have other West European powers, such as France and Great Britain.  Hence officials of all 
governments have insisted on the reliability of Russian gas supplies, and even the 2006 Russia-
Ukraine gas conflict did not seem to call into question this basic tenet of German energy policy. 
E. Conclusion 
Germany has traditionally been a leading proponent of European integration.  Yet in 
recent years, it has been ambivalent about, if not downright antagonistic toward, the creation of a 
common EU energy policy.  Successive German governments have resisted or at least not 
supported some of the most central elements of EU policy, especially energy market 
liberalization and external energy relations. 
This ambivalence has been grounded in large part in the structure of the German energy 
sector, which has been dominated by a small number of gas and electricity companies, and the 
particular interests of those powerful companies.  Those companies have opposed various efforts 
to liberalize the gas and electricity markets and have sought to retain a free hand in negotiations 
with foreign suppliers such as Gazprom.  In turn, successive German governments have tended 
to give voice to those commercial interests in negotiations at the EU level. 
Even where German officials might see some advantage, such as lower energy prices, in 
supporting Commission initiatives, they confront a “chicken-and-egg” problem.  Until the 
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European energy markets are fully integrated and liberalized, the security of Germany’s energy 
supply will depend to an important extent on the maintenance of strong national companies that 
can compete and negotiate on roughly equal terms with state-owned enterprises and powerful 
foreign energy interests.  But as long as they exist, those same companies will lobby against 
further liberalization measures. 
Nevertheless, the last couple of years have seen some developments that provide reasons 
for optimism.  In 2008, several of the large German energy utilities, including E.On, RWE, and 
Vattenfall, under pressure from the Commission for allegedly engaging in uncompetitive 
practices, decided to sell their transmission networks.  This unexpected development raised 
hopes that other giant energy concerns, in Germany and elsewhere, would follow suit. 
An even more recent development has brought German policy more in line with that of 
the other major EU member states as well as the preferences of the Commission.  In 2009, 
national elections brought to power a new government that promised to review German energy 
policy, especially the nuclear phase-out decision.  The following year, the Black-Yellow 
coalition prepared a new energy concept paper that called for extending the lifetimes of the 
remaining nuclear power plants (BMWi/BMU 2010).  
In addition, the new energy concept suggests a greater degree of emphasis on pursuing 
Germany’s energy policy goals at the European level.  One of the longest (of nine) section is 
devoted to the issue of energy supply in the European and international context.  Other proposed 
steps including supporting the import of green electricity from third countries and pushing 
forward the creation of an integrated electricity market through new transmission lines in Europe 
and beyond.  Nevertheless, it is too soon to tell whether these developments suggest more than 
minor adjustments in German policy, rather than a fundamental reorientation. 
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End Notes 
1. From 2002 to 2005, the BMWi was combined with part of the traditional Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs to form a superministry known as the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Labour (BMWA) 
2. In 2009, Russia withdrew from the treaty (Westphal 2009b). 
